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Can Community Clinics Survive?
A Comparative Study of Law Centres in
Australia, Ontario and England
FREDERICK H. ZEMANS AND ANEURIN THOMAS

Introduction

This Chapter grows out of the authors' research into contemporary developments
in legal aid in Canada and the international environment. It focuses particularly
on community clinics and their equivalents jn Australia, Ontario and England. All
three jurisdictions have adapted the American store-front legal clinic model to the
needs and legal cultures of their society. Jn Ontario and England, legal aid has
been dominated by the j udicare system, emphasising the case-by-case delivery of
legal services by private members of the legal profession (Zemans, 1994).
J\.ustralia has a mixed model, in which over half of individual casework is dealt
with by salaried lawyers in legal aid!. commissions (Fleming, 1994; Crockett,
1994). However, community-based organisations, variously called 'community
legal centres' in Australia, 'legal clinics' in Ontario·and ' law centres' in the United
Kingdom, have made a contribution to legal aid services that is out of proportion
to the resources devoted to them (Kuras, 1994; Stephens, 1991; OLAFS, 1991).
Here we look at each jurisdiction in turn. We start by examining the history of
these clinics and their progressive roots. We then consider their present activities
and future in a world in which governments increasingly emphasjse centralised
decision-making and control. Governments now speak the language of priorities,
cost-effectiveness, financial and operational accountability, quality assurance and
co-ordination. Centres perceive such demands for accountability as a threat to
their independence. They fear a profound change, that will jeopardise their
community roots and hamper innovation. We ask whether strategies arc available
to allow clinics to retain their independence and uniqueness in the face of these
pressures to 'bureaucratise'.

Australia
Out of the three jurisdictions, Australia has the most generous provision. In 1997,
there were 151 community legal centres, or 8.1 centres for every nrillion people
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(NACLC, 1997). 1 This compares to 6.4 centres per million population in Ontario
and a mere 1.1 in Rngland. 2
The first centre, Fitzroy Legal Service, was established in 1973. At the heart
of the movement to develop community legal centres was a fundamental disenchantment with the manner in which traditional legal services dealt with the
disadvantaged of society which was placing a particular emphasis on individuals
and a case-by-case approach (Basten et al., 1983; Chesterman, 1996). Inspired by
a commitment to equality before the law and a belief that social and structural
change could be achieved through the legal system and community-based
activism, centres sought to dismantle the barriers faced by the poor in securing
access to justice. Consequently, their work has focused on disadvantaged individuals and groups within Australian society.
AustraHan community legal centres may be defi ned as community-based and
community-managed organisations, structured to provide 'free, accessible and
easy to understand legal services .. .' (NACLC, 1996). To combat the economic
barriers, the early legal centres offered free legal advice to their clients. Although
community legal centres lacked sufficient resources to provide extensive litigation services, they provided support in the form of advice and education for
clients engaged in litigation. Some centres were able to finance public interest or
test cases with legal aid funds from the state Legal Aid Commissions. Cases were
selected on their capacity to benefit the greatest munber of people in a client
group and on the requirement of a reasonable chance of success.3
Client involvement was central to the community legal centre movement's ideology. It was intended to overcome the sense of powerlessness of those confro nting
the legal system. The community legal centres also established networks of people
facing similar problems, with the intention of reJieving the sense of isolation felt by
many disadvantaged clients and facilitating a view of their problems which encompassed the broader social context.4 Leaders of the community legal centre movement saw the formation of community groups and organisations as a vehicle for
solidaiity with the capacity to create community campaigns and social movements
addressing the social problems facing their clients. As well, the community legal
centre served as a resource for the community, providing assistance and advice.
1

This does not include the 23 Aboriginal and Torres Stait ls1ander legal aid services, which are
managed and funded entirely separately and tend to concentrate on criminal law issues. These particular services are outside the scope of our study.
2 However, English law centres are larger. While Australian centres have an average of 6.2 full
and parf-lime staff per centre, English law centres have 8.9 (NACLC, 1997; personal communication
with Law Centres Federation, London).
3 . This practice has generally been limited to some of the specialist centres such as the Consumer
Credit Legal Services, the Disability Discrimination and Welfare Rights services and the
Environmental Defenders Office. See National Association of Community Legal Centres, 1996.
4 For example, landlord-tenant disputes were a common class of problems faced by clients of
community legal centres. These disputes arose from the fact that in many jurisdictions in Australia
there was inadequate low-cost housing and furthermore, tenancy laws generally were overwhelming
in favour of the landlord. See Basten, Graycar and Neal, 1983:180.
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Many of their features were perceived as radical at the time of their development,
including informal physical surroundings, accessible opening hours, group work,
community legal education, law reform and a heavy reliance on volunteers. They
have been typified as adhering to notions of 'grass-roots ·level organization,
community control, empowering the recipient, de-professionalisation, human rights
... free access to services ' (Basten et at., 1983:179). In the 1970s and 1980s, the
conununity legal centres' programme roots and radical style of delivery prompted
conflict with the private profession due to fears of loss of work and income
(Cheste1man, 1996). Relations with governments have also been heated at times.
Nevertheless, although conflict persists over funding levels to community legal
centres, they have fi nally been accepted by the profession and governments as integral to the legal aid infrastructure.
Commonwealth and state governments provide the overwhelming majority of
funding. 5 Despite this, centres have always stressed their independence, from
both government and the legal profession. Originally, decisions were made by the
membership, a broad concept that included not only volunteers and employees
but also members of the community. During the formative stages of Fitzroy Legal
Services, for example, extensive open meetings were held for all members
(Chesterman, 1996). However, the ideal of community control, central to the
centres' 01iginal mandate, has not been fully realised (Basten et al., 1983: 180).
Centres have progressed from relying almost entirely on volunteers to being
employing organisations. As a result, the character of centres has changed and
paid staff have become the dominant decision-makers. Despite this, there continues to be a strong reliance on volunteers, including not only volunteer lawyers,
but also social workers, paralegals and students. The National Association of
Community Legal Centres (1997:31) calculates that on average each centre has
two to three solicitors, three or four other pa.id staff and 21 volunteers. 6
Centres have been defined by two different notions of community. Generalist
centres are organised with reference lo communities defined by geographical
boundaiies and offer services covering most areas of non-com mercial law.
Specialist centres are organised around communities of common interest (such as
tenants, young people, refugees, women or consumers) and provide services
designed to deal with problems in these areas. While generalist centres tend to
concentrate on referral, information, advice and education, the specialist centres
conduct more test cases and carry out significant law refo1m activities (OLAFS,
1991).
5 In 1995/96, community legal centres' income totalled approximately AS$19 million of which
the Commonwealth contributed AS$15 million and state governments most of the remainder
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1997:33).
6 Data is drawn from a survey of 140 centres for a professional indemnity scheme. Between
them the 140 centres employed 316 full or part-time solicitors, 554 full or part-time other staff and
used 3,004 volunteers. The involvement of volunteers is much greater than in the UK, where law
centres use on average only 5 volunteers each (Law Centres Federation, personal communication,

1998).
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Table 3.1: Legal Centres across Australia in 1992
State

Victoria
New South Wales
Queensland
South AustraLia
Weslern Auslralia
Tasmania
Aust. Capital Terr.
Northern T~rritory
Total

No. of
cenlres

No. of
centres per
m. pop.

38
24
18
7
10
5

9.0
4.1
6.0
4.8
6.1
10.7
3.4

15
16
10
1
5
1
1

6.0

0

1
l
104

No. of
specialist
centres

49

(39%)
(67%)
(56%)
(14%)
(50%)
(20%)
(JOO%)
(47%)

Source: Williams ( 1992: 293)

The various Australian states differ markedly in their mix of specialist and
generalist centres. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of community legal centres in
1992, illustrating the differing state traditions when it comes to funding centres .
Victoria leads the way, though Tasmania is generous in propo1tion to its small
population. In New South Wales the specialist tradition predominates. South
Australia, on the other hand, has little in the way of specialist provision, and lacks
the same culture of educational or reform work. In Western Australia, centres take
what has been termed a 'social-work' approach, motivated by a strong suspicion
of lawyers.
Despite these differences, however, there are many common threads. Across
all centres, assistance to individuals is a major, and often predominant, aspect of
centres' work. Centres estimate that, collectively, they assist approximately
300,000 people annually (NACLC, 1997). A government study of four centres
carried out in the 1990s found that 26-48 per cent of time was spent on advice,
representation and referrals to other agencies. Community legal education took
8-16 per cent of time, law and administrative reform 6-1 4 per cent and administration and service development 19-54 per cent (OLAFS, 1991: 100-1).
However, although the time allocation was relatively low, all four centres carried
out an impressive range of community education work. They prepared guides and
newsletters, gave local talks and courses and even produced radio programmes.
Increasi ngly, centres arc co-operating in such activities and implementing
programmes through State Federations and working groups.
The pressing question is how far community legal centres will be able to
survive the change of political cultures implicit in the rise of the 'New Right'.
Centres developed as part of the expansion of the welfare state, whereas now:
'The ideology of the "neo-conservative" New Right rejects the concept of the

---
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welfare state, takes the rhetoric of individualism literally and downplays the probable adverse social and political consequences of the "conflictual order" it advocates' (Jayasuriya, 1996:19-20).
With a growing focus on economic rationalisation, the desire of governments
to 'balance the budget' seems to apply regardless of which political party is in
power. Social spending has been cut and programmes abandoned, reduced or
transferred to the private sector. With cuts to welfare and other social
programmes, the gap between the rich and the poor in Australian society has
increased and more and more fall below the poverty line (Jayasuriya, 1996;
Noone, 1997).
Despite the rise of the New Right, however, community legal centres have
fared reasonably well for most of the last ten years, securing increased official
recognition. In 1987, for example, the Labor Commonwealth Government
created the National Legal Aid Advisory Committee (NLAAC) to advise the
Minister responsible for legal aid. The Committee, which undertook a comprehensive review of the Australian legal aid system, published its final report in
1990 calling for the Commonwealth Government to take a more active leadership
in the provision of legal aid (NLAAC, 1990). It was positive about the role of
centres, and reconunended improved access for the socially excluded, such as
social security claimants, homeless young people and prisoners.
Shortly thereafter the Minister of Justice and the Commonwealth AttorneyGcncral formed the Access to Justice Advisory Committee to 'make recommendations for reform of the administration of the Commonwealth Justice and legal
system to enhance access to justice and render the system fairer, more efficient
and more effective' (AJAC, 1994). When, in 1994, this Committee released its
rcpo1t, it also affirmed the notion that the Commonwealth should play a leadership role as the major funder of Australian legal aid. It endorsed the work of
community legal centres and caUed for more programmes designed to provide
community legal education, telephone advice and legal training for community
and social workers (AJAC, 1994).
Alongside these endorsements came a steady increase in funding. The number
of centres rose from 104 in 1992 to 151 in 1996. The Labor Government
responded to the report with the Justice Statement of May 1995, by announcing
that national funding of legal aid would increase by $68 million over a four year
period, including an additional $14 million for law centres. The introduction
stated that: 'The Commonwealth will also assert its proper role and authority as
the major provider of legal aid funding. It will ensure that community needs
regarding legal assistance are addressed fairly and efficiently, and that legal aid
policies are oriented to meet community expectations' (Government of Australia,

1995: 1).
It recogni~ed the impo1tance of community legal centres and endorsed the
principle of community control: 'The government recognises that community
legal centres' close links to their communities are an important part of their

'.
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effectiveness and accessibility and will continue to support and foster this fundamental characteristic through community participation and development'
(Government of Australia, 1995:109).
Implementation of the new package, however, was interrupted by the election
of a new Conservative Government in March 1996. At first, the legal aid system
seemed reasonably secure but the climate soon changed. Regan explains that:
In the election policy statements the then Opposition pledged to 'maintain current levels
of legal aid funding as well as funding to community legal centres'. Legal Aid
Commissions were therefore shocked when, in the August budget, the new government
announced its decision to cut legal aid expenditures. The proposed $33 million cut for each
of the following three years represented approximately 20% of the Commonwealth expenditure, a drastic reduction by any measure. Surprisingly, instead of Attorney General Daryl
Williams arguing that legal aid was ineffective, or inefficient, he argued that the cut was
part of his Department's cont.J.ibution to the new government's debt reduction strategy
(Regan, 1997).

While the brunt of the cuts fell on the official legal aid commissions, community
legal centres experienced a smaller but significant cut of 4 per cent of commonwealth funding over the next two years. The additional monies promised by the
Justice Statement were also cut. Needless to say, the cuts created difficulties for
many centres, though none was forced to close.
Governments are not only reducing funding, but are also increasing managerial control. So far, the main effect has been felt within the legal aid commissions
but pressure is also mounting on community legal centres. In 1995, the AttorneyGeneral of Victoria introduced legislation which transformed the state legal aid
commission into Victoria Legal Aid, a body which is corporate in structure and
function. The old commission included representatives from a wide range of
those concerned with legal services: the legal profession, community legal
centres, salaried legal aid staff and the Council for Social Services. These were
removed from Victoria Legal Aid, which was stTuctured to provide greater efficiency and control (Noone, 1997:27). Meanwhile the Commonwealth and state
governments have begun joint reviews of community legal centres in three states
'with a view to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations'
(Keys Young, 1997). Governments may, in the future, rationalise centres and
intervene in their activities more than they have to date.
Australian community legal centres are a success story. Until very recently,
they have managed surprisingly well in the darkening economic and political
clima~e. However, things are now taking a distinct turn for the worse. While the
Commonwealth Government may endorse community participation in community legal centres, recent developments in the legal aid system indicate that the
measure of success is the quantity of legal services purchased for every dollar
(Noone, 1997:28). Community legal centres will have to compete for decreasing
funding with the private profession, with commissions, with other welfare organisations and with each other. At the same time, poverty is increasing and legal aid
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conunissions have fewer resources to help people in need. Community legal
centres find their workloads rising at a time when their own resources are declining. Finally, the movement towards both more 'corporate l*~' structures for the
administration of legal aid and to national planning, thi'eatens the community
basis of the legal centres' movement. This restricts the voice of the community
and lessens the ability of the disadvantaged to express their views and to effect
change thrnugh the system (Noone, 1997:29).

Ontario

If Australia's community legal centres have been successful, Ontatio's have been
even more so. Ontatio's 1967 Legal Aid Act established a statutory light to legal
aid and acknowledged the obligation of the government to individuals who could
not afford a lawyer. The Act was premised on a desire to make the same legal
services available to the poor as were already available to 'fee-paying' clients.
Legal services were to be delivered through the judicare model, using private
lawyers as service providers. The Act effectively established legal aid as a government-funded social programme for the poor.
The Act also set out the basic governance and management structure of the
Ontario Plan, specifying that the Law Society would administer and determine
policy for the Plan, and establishing with accompanying regulations, its coverage
and basic financial eligibility criteria. The Plan was embraced by the profession.
Approximately half of all Ontario lawyers registered their names on legal aid
panels to be called if their services were required. The Plan was also embraced by
the public, and both the number of certificates issued by and the total costs of the
Plan grew considerably dw'ing this period.
Despite the growing number of certificates, in the late 1960s and early 1970s
many lawyers and social activists concluded that poor people often had much
different legal needs from 'fee-paying' clients. These analysts bel ieved that judicare lawyers were not qualified to address the legal needs of the poor (Taman,
1971 :9). As a result, a different delivery model was required: the community legal
aid clinic, a model based on the American neighbourhood legal clinic. As in
Australia, early community clinics were guided by five principles: a strong focus
on the legal needs of the poor; community involvement in decision-making; independence from government and the Law Society-controlled Ontario Legal Aid
Plan (OLAP); a broad definition of 'legal services', including law reform, public
legal education and community development; and rel iance on staff lawyers and
non-lawyers to deliver services.
The early clinics' radical focus was reflected in their governance structure and
staffing poli~ies. Clinics were governed by 'conununity boards of directors' and
were staffed by a combination of salaried lawyers and saladed 'community legal
workers'. The community legal worker concept was new to the province. Neither
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lawyers nor administrative staff, 'CLWs ' were primarily community organisers
whose focus was community legal education, law reform and community development.
The first community legal aid clinic in Ontario was established in 1971.7 The
early clinics were established outside of the existing OLAP management st.ructttre and fu nded by a variety of charitable and government grants. As a result, the
clinics had a considerable degree of independence. At this ti me, the clinics were
not formally organised into a 'clinic system'.
As the number of clinics grew, pressure mounted on the provincial government
to provide them with fundi ng. As a result, the provincial Attorney General
appointed a Task Force on Legal Aid in 1973. Officially recognising the validity
of the clinic approach to legal services for the poor, the 1974 Task Force Report
on Legal Aid (the Osler Report) recommended a 'mixed' delivery system for legal
aid in which the existing judicare system would be supplemented by staffed
neighbourhood legal clinics fun ded by the provincial government. Mr Justice
Osler noted that 'the poor have many problems peculiarly their own ... [the poor]
are tenants not landlords, debtors not creditors, pu1·chasers not vendors' (Osler
Report, 1974:39). More precisely their needs have been seen as relating to housing law, income maintenance law (including welfare, fami ly benefits, employment insurance, Canada Pensions, and workers compensation); work-related
issues (including employment standards and occupational health and safety); and
consumer and debt problems. Like other areas of law, the interpretation of the
complex statutory and regulatory schemes in these fields often depends on legal
assistance.
The provincial government accepted the Osler Report's clinic recommendations. In 1976, a regulation under the Legal Aid Act established funding for the
existing twenty-two legal aid clinics in the province (Ontario Regulation, 1976).
In 1978, Mr Justice Samuel Grange conducted another provincial inquiry into
legal aid, intended to examine the relationship between the c1inics, OLAP, and the
private bar. Like the Osler Report, the Report of the Commission on Clinical
Funding (the Gra1ige Report) affomed the mjxed delivery system of 1egal aid in
Ontario, concluding that community clinics played a significant role in Ontario's
legal aid system. (Grange Report, 1978) The Report found that the clientele and
legal issues addressed by the certificate programme and clinic programme were
very different. As a result, the Report viewed the relationship between clinics and
the private bar as one of co-operation, not competition, encouraging the growth
of clinics to complement the services provided by the private bar under judicare.
Importantly, the Report concluded that cli nics should have 'autonomy with
respect to policy and administration, subject only to accountability for the public
7

Parkdale Community Legal Services was a pilol project funded by the Federal Department of
Health and Welfare, the Council for Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, and York
University (Zemans, 1997).
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funds advanced and for the legal competence of the services rendered' (Grange
Report, 1978:22). Policy and administrative autonomy were considered necessary
to ensure community control and preserve the clinics' law·reform mandate.
In 1979, the Grange Report's recommendations were incorporated into a regulation of the Legal Aid Act establishing the structure of provincial funding for
clinics. The 'Clinic Funding Regulation' attempted to preserve clinic autonomy
by effectively dividing the governance of community legal clinics between the
Law Society's Clinic Funding Committee (CFC) and volunteer, elected community Boards of Directors specific to each c1inic. The CFC, like the Legal Aid
Committee, is a Standing Corrunittee of the Law Society, separate from the Legal
Aid Committee, responsible for establishing policy and guidelines in respect of
the funding of clinics and administering the clinic funding programme (Ontatio
Regulation, 1990). The clinics' operational policies-including determination of
case priorities, other activities and financial eligibility-are intended to be determined by democratically elected, volunteer Boards of Directors. The Regulation
attempts to preserve clinic autonomy by establishing a complicated series q_f
checks and balances between the CFC and the clinic funding staff (CFS). Initial
funding decisions are made by the CFS but are ultimately detennined by the CFC
(Ontario Regulation, 1990). Distanced from the application process, the CFC
hears appeals of funding decisions (Mossman, 1983).
There are currently seventy cHnics in Ontario, serving over 100 communities;
there cu·e two main categories of clinics: general and specialty clinics. Fifty-six
clinics are general service clinics, offering services in core areas of poverty law
practice. Fourteen clinics are specialty cli nics which specialise in a particular area
· of law or in the legal needs of a specific client group, such as the Advocacy Centre
for the Elderly, the Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped, Justice for
Children and Youth, the Centre for Spanish-Speaking Peoples, the Canadian
Environmental Law Association and university clinics.8 Ontaiio also has three
clinics affiliated with university law schools in the province: the CotTectional
Law Project (Queen's University), Legal Assistance of Windsor (University of
Windsor) and Parkdale Community Legal Services (Osgoode Hall Law School).9
In 1996, clinics canicd 37,097 files, provided summary advice in 147,636
poverty law matters, made approximately 70,000 referrals to social services,
community agencies or private lawyers, conducted 2,055 public legal education
sessions (reaching more than 72,000 people) and presented 792 briefs or

8 The list of specialty clinics also includes: Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, Community

Legal Education Ontario, Correctional Law Project, Industrial Accident Victims Group of Ontario,
Injured Workers' Consultant, Landlord's Self-Help Centre, Metro Tenants Legal Services, Metro
Toronto Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic, Pay Equity Advocacy and Legal Services, Metro
Toronlo Chinese and Southeast Legal Clinic, Pay Equity and Legal Services and Toronto Worker's
Health and Safety Legal Clinic.
9 Law students in these programmes complete a one-term placement in the clinic, earning academic credits while undertaking practical clinical work.

..
74

.Frederick H. Zem.ans and Aneurin Thomas

submissions in court or tribunal cases. LO They also produced videos and
pamphlets, pursued law reform initiatives and launched community development projects which assist clients to organise and to form self-help groups
focused on low-income issues, including injured workers and tenant associations (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1992:7). Simple case totals, however, may
not reflect the relative complexity or impact of a single case. One clinic may
specialise in complex test-case litigation, another in high-volume case representation. Clinics have always operated under capped budgets and their funding
has been frozen since 1993 . In 1995/6 the clinic system cost slightly more that
10% of the total legal aid budget (Ontario Legal Aid Revi ew, 1997; Clinic
Funding Submission).
As not-for-profit corporations, clinics arc managed by elected boards of directors who are responsible for clinic administration, personnel management (b oards
are the employers of the staff of each cb nic), financial management, the determination of legal services to be provided (both the choice of area and the methods
or strategies to be used) and the evaluation of services. 11 The day-to-day management of each clinic is the responsibility of the executive director (a member of the
staff).
The practices of most geographically based clinics are heavily weighted in the
areas of social assistance (family benefits, general welfare assistance), workers'
compensation, employment insurance, Canada pensions, housing (landlord and
tenant, homelessness), and consumer problems: those areas of law which impact
pervasively upon the lives of poor persons. The specialty clinics address a range
of other legal issues of particular significance to their communities. Casework is
the predominant activity of most clinics. Over the more than two decades of clinic
operation, some clinics have offered limited services in criminal, fam ily and other
civil matters on an exceptional basis. Such assistance, however, has generally
been provided only where clients have little access to other legal services, primarily in remote areas.
Two recent reports prompted by the fiscal ctisis in OLAP's certificate
programme strongly supported the goals and operations of Ontario's community
clinic system and recommended the clinic system as a model for Ontario's legal
aid system as a whole. The first, Froni Crisis to Reform: A New Legal Aid Plan
for Ontario (Zemans and Monahan, 1997) was a p1ivately funded report written
to See CommuniLy Legal Clinics Statistics Discussion Paper, 1996, and letter from Clinic
Fundi.ng,Staff to Boards and Deans of Law Schools (29 Nov. 1996) [unpubJishedl. The clinic funding
staff have stated lhal there are rrumy problems in lhe processes used to gather the information reported
by these statistics. For example, there is a lack of consistency between matters identified as case files
and those identified as summary advice; the swearing of affidavits may be counted as summary intake
in one clinic and as a case file in another. The clinic funding staJI have finalised a new scheme for data
collection, based upon new (and defined) categories to match actual clinic practices better, and this
new system was put in place in 1998.
11 These responsibilities are spelled out in the Clinic Funding Operating Manual for clinics and
in Clinic certificates.
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by Osgoode Hall Law School Professors Frederick Zemans and Palrick
Monahan. 12 The second, A Blueprint for Publicly Fwided Legal Services (Ontario
Legal Aid Review, 1997) (hereinafter McCamus Report); was a report by an independent task force funded and appointed by the provincial government. The
McCanius Report staled that:
The community clinic model meets many of the goals we have identified for the larger
legal aid system. The community clinic system can run on a capped budget; it works to
understand and respond to individual and community needs; it utilizes lawyers, nonlawyers, public legal education initiatives, and other delivery systems in order to deliver
services cost-effectively; it prioritizes needs and attempts to meet them strategically; it has
developed linkages to nonlegal service providers; and it has recently adopted a quality
assurance program (McCamus Report, 1997: vol. l, c. J1).

Both reports strongly endorsed the principle of community governance as fundamental to the success of the clinic system and the delivery of poverly law
services. Each noted the importance of commu nity-elected boards to the independence of the clinics, to identifying and prioritising community needs and to
ensuring accountability to the clinic community.
Both reports also noted that the present division of responsibilities between the
Legal Aid Committee and the Clinic Funding Committee does not work very
weU. The Zemans-Monahan Report stated that the two committees exist as 'two
solitudes', with decisions by each committee often, if not usually, being made
without reference to the other. Despite this strong statement, both reports ultimately recommended comparatively modest efforts to improve co-ordination
between clinics and the overall system.
The Zemans-Monahan study recommended that the provincial community
clinic system should be integrated into the same regional board structtu·e they
recomme!lded for the system as a whole (Zemans and Monahan, 1997:167). The
study stated that these regional boards should eventually assume the duties and
responsibilities of the current CFC. The formal relationship between a community clinic and its regional board should be established in a detailed operating
agreement or an equivalent of the current clinic certificate issued by the clinic
Funding Committee. The McCamus Report recommended even more limited
structural reforms. Rather than recommending a fu ll integration of the clinic
system, the McCamus Report recommended thal individual clinics and lhe overall clinic system should initiate a multi-year strategic planning process and that
the Executive Director of each clinic and the Area Dfrector of each OLAP area
office should sit on each other's boards. Both reports recommended clinic representation on the Board of Directors of the proposed new statutory agency.
The more controversial recommendation of each report was that the clinic
budget and the system's overaU budget be integrated. The current LegalAidAct
explicitly separates the ce1tificate programme budget and the clinic programme
12 The sn1dy was funded by The Donner Canadian Foundation.
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budget. Each programme has its own distinct statutory funding regime. As a
result, monies designated for one programme cannot be transferred to the otber. 13
The two reports came to the sam e conclusion. The Zemans-Monahan Report
argued that clinics face grave threats to their funding if they remain dependent
upon direcl grants from the provincial government. They thought that the current
funding structure, organised around dedicated grants to the Clinic Funding
Committee, did not sufficiently protect clinics from potentially severe budget
cutbacks initiated by a provincial government which was intent on cutting costs
across the board or one which might be resentfu l of the clinics' law reform activities. They argued that the current funding structure, organised around dedicated
grants to the clinic structure, unnecessarily nrurnws the political constituency
supportive of clinic funding (Zemans and Monahan, 1997:105).
Implicit in both reports was the conclusion that the present funding structure
has contributed to the 'two solitudes', sepru·ating the clinic and certificate
programmes. Both reports recommended that the budget integration be phased in
over a period of years.
The public, legal aid stakeholders, and the provincial government were very
supportive of the McCam.us Report's recommendations. Seeing the writing on the
wall, and itself fed up with the constant headaches of administering a large social
welfare programme, in February 1998 the Law Society voted overwhelmingly in
favour of a motion to transfer responsibility for the administration of the L egal
Aid Plan to an independent statutory corporation (Makin, 1998). They proposed
that the Board of the new agency should be made up of provincial government
appointees, Law Society appointees, and a Chair appointed from names recommended by a nominating committee comprised of the Attorney-General, the
Treasmer of the Law Society, and a mutually agreed third parly. In contrast to
both the Zemans-Monahan and McCamus recommendations, the Law Society
model did not explicitly include a clinic representative on the Board of the
proposed agency.
Clinic representatives were alarmed by the Law Society model's lack of a
dedicated clinic or consumer representative on the Board, interpreting the L aw
Society's proposal as a major regression from the McCamus model. Moreover,
the model obviously ignored many of protections built into the McCamus model,
including a Board-level clinic committee with dedicated staff. By way of contrast,
the Association of Community Clinics of Ontario rcconunended a Board and
agency structure which would considerably dilute the perceived power of judicare

lJ This separation was intentionai. The authors of the original Clinic Funding Regulation feared
that 'pooling' the clinic and certificate programme budgets would give the Law Society lhc opportunity to systematically divert clinic resources to the certificate programme. This fear-which many, if
not most, contemporary clinic supporters share-is founded on a belief lhat the Law Society's
commitment to private-bar delivery of legal aid would take precedence over its commitment to clinics, especially during times of fiscal restraint. According to this view, the formal separation of the two
budgets is absolutely critical to the continued survival of the clinics.
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lawyers to restructure or reduce funding for comnrnnity clinks. Tt recommended
that the Board should have as many non-lawyers as lawyers; thal the Law Society
should be obligated to appojnt at least one clinic staff p~rsoni and that at least
three members of the Board should be consumer representatives." lt also recommended the establishment of a Standing Board-level clinic committee with dedicated staff and that the agency should have a dedicated clinic budget, expressed
as a minimum percentage of the overall legal aid budget.
To date, the provincial government has not made any final decision on legal
aid reform, although legislation is expected in the near future. In the present environment, clinic representatives are extremely wary of what they fear may be
significant changes to the long-standing rules governing relationships between
independent community clinics and the funding authority. They have repeatedly
stated that the basic governance and funding structure set out in the Grange
Report were fundamentally sound. They are suspicious of efforts to introduce
system-wide statistical collection, quality assurance measures, perfo1mance
measures, or service priorities and consider such initiatives as infringements on
clinic independence.
Clinic res~stance to contemporary provincial government social programme
management techniques (quality assurance, pe1fo1mance measures, co-ordination
of services, etc.) has led many commentators and stakeholders-including the
authors of the Zemans-Monahan. and McCamus Reports, clinic funding staff,
administrators of the certificate programme, and representatives of the provincial
government- to criticise the community clinic system as being inefficient or
lacking accountability. The debate has intensified with the capping of certificate
programme funding and the pressure on government and legal aid administrators
to improve the cost-efficiency and financial accountability of the entire system.
The ongoing debate about integration, co-ordination and independence is often
reduced to a recital of the merits of clinic system 'centralisation' versus the merits
of relatively unfettered clinic 'autonomy'. Some analysts argue that the CFC's
funding power gives it authority and responsibility to take a more assertive role
in co-ordinating clinic planning and operations in the name of promoting
accountability, efficiency and system-wide co-ordination. Others stress the
importance of clinic independence, arguing that the CFC's funding power is
limited by the power of community boards to determine individual seivice priorities and clinic operations.
More than twenty years after the promulgation of the original Regulation,
the debate remains vibrant. The paradox of the 1970s Grange model is that the
same governance structure which has historically protected the clinic system
against intrusions fromjudicare lawyers and the provincial government has also
led to significant criticisms of clinics. The same transformative activities (law
reform, community development) which make the clinic system successful also
render it politically vulnerable. In fact, the clinic system is in a bind.
Community clinics cannot easily embrace the ethos of cost-effectiveness and
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co-ordination or integration within the larger system without significant consequences; any attempt to justify law reform or community development initiatives on the ground of cost-effectiveness, however valid, is a hard sell to the
same politicians and funders who are often the focus of the clinic's political
organising.
Opponents of the clinic model often criticise the focus on law reform. They
argue that law reform activities are not strictly 'legal', that law reform diverts
attention and resources away from individual clients, and that it is inappropriate
to spend public money on 'political' activities. This l~tter argument is particularly
common within the halls of government. By way of contrast, community clinic
supporters have argued that law reform is an integral and inevitable part of the
clinics' work. As Janet Mosher has argued, 'The law reform work of clinics,
pruticularly in situations where clinics act as a resource to low-income communities to facilitate their direct participation in law reform activities, enhances
justice. At a more pragmatic level, participation of low-income communiti es wm
result in better laws' (Mosher, 1997:935). Our view is that the long-term success
of the community clinic model depends upon community clinics retaining their
law reform focus. The original justification for the law reform mandate remains
as valid today as in the early 1970s, perhaps even more so.
Clinics such as the Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped, Justice
for Children and Youth, the Conectional Law Project, and the Advocacy Centre
for the Elderly, the unquestioned experts in their respective fields, have made
invaluable contributions to the development of laws and policies for the betterment of all Ontarians. These specialty clinics have been able to devote more
resources to law reform activities than general service clinics. As well, they are
more likely to have well established links to social/political movements with the
same goals. Finally, specialty clinics have been able to develop larger strategies,
working with others in a larger social/political movement, in order to target
resources and skills effectively. The Advocacy Resoui·cc Centre for the
Handicapped, for example, is often viewed as the legal arm of Ontario's disability movement. In contrast, while general service clinics often assess and litigate
cases based upon their view of the long-term strategic impact of that case on a
class of individuals or group, as a matter of necessity and mandate they ru·e often
required to restrict the scope of their law refo1m analysis to local activities and
circumstances. As a result, the impact of their law reform activities is often
localised. Most importantly, limited funding and the dire needs of their clients put
incredible pressure on general service clinics to focus on individual casework.
Important challenges confront the community clinic system's ability to benefit persons with low incomes through law reform. First and foremost, law and li tigation is a limited, discrete tool. Political change generally requires a broad-based
political strategy, of which legal work and litigation may be but one component.
Political change also requires development of broad-based community support,
media, lobbying, etc.-all of which requires more diverse skills than clinics are
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likely to be able to provide. Secondly, law reform often draws unwanted attenti on
to the clinic system, raising the obvious potential for a governmenl to cut off
funding for clinics in order to silence political critics. In Ontario this potential has
not been realised to date, despite the grumbling of successive provincial governments. Thirdly, it is not yet clear how law reform activities can be assessed, quantified or evaluated within 'modern' legal aid administrations which emphasise
business planning, quality assurance, cost-effectiveness and management
accountability.
Although the Provincial Government has not formally announced its plan for
legal aid reform in Ontario, both the Attorney-General and staff in the provincial
Ministry of the Attorney-General have been consulting with community clinic
representatives on the basis that the community clinic system will continue to be
an important component of the 'new' legal aid system in Ontario; amendments to
the Province's Legal Aid Act will preserve independent community boards; the
new legislation will require the new legal aid agency to deliver 'poverty law'
services and that, at the very least, the board of the new agency will include
consumer representatives.
The Government has, however, also announced its intention to improve the
cost-effectiveness and co-ordination of all the Ontario Legal Aid Plan's services,
including community clinics. To date, the Government has not announced details
of these measures. The Government's commitments have been clearly been influenced by, and are consistent with, the recommendations of the McCamus
Commission. If Ontario's new legal aid legislation matches these commitments,
the community clinic system in Ontario will have retained an enviable measure
of legislative protection and stability.

England and Wales
English law centres, like their Australian counterparts, have faced many challenges, first from the profession and secondly from their principal funders.
Unfortunately for them, they have never managed to attract the all-round support
afforded to Ontario community legal aid clinics. Yet it all began so optimistically.
The introduction of judicare in the United Kingdom in the early 1950s contained
provision for state-salaried lawyers (albeit appointed and controlled by the Law
Society) to complement the efforts of the private profession in poorer areas.
However, although retained in the legislation to the present day, the provision was
never implemented. As a result the law centre movement in England and Wales,
as in Australia and Ontario, owed its origins to a dissatisfaction with judicarc as
a means of addressing the legal needs of the poor. With the notable exception of
the very first law centre to be set up in England and Wales in 1970, in North
Kensington, the early neighbourhood law centres were attracted by the model of
the community law centres in the United States. They focused strongly on the
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legal needs of the poor, favoured community involvement and independence from
the private profession (including the professional bodies), were prepared to
handle test cases in pursuit of law reform, engaged in public legal education and
relied on a mix of staff lawyers and lay workers. North Kensington, however,
sought to restrict its efforts largely to individual casework, seeing itself as closely
akin to private practice.
Soon after the first law centres were established the Government bowed to the
pressure of the Society of Labour Lawyers, the Conservative Lawyers Group, the
National Consumer Council, and the Law Society•. by introducing a greatly
expanded advice and assistance scheme, known as the 'Green Form' scheme.
With a simple financial eligibility test and covering any area of English law, it
was hoped that the Green Form scheme would encourage the private profession
to use it in poverty law areas, rather than crime and family cases which had do1runated judicare since its inception. While law centres found imaginative ways of
using the scheme, e.g. by combining multiple applications with extensions to
fund the acquisition of experts' reports (Paterson, 1979) the private profession
showed no similar flexibility. Payments for social welfare law cases rose
painfully slowly from 10.7 per cent of Green Form accounts in 1975176 to 16.6
per cent in 1985/86 and 21 per cent in 1990/91 (Goriely, 1994; Smith, 1997b).
During the same period it was estimated that nearly 60 per cent of the work of
English and Welsh law centres concerned housing, welfare, employment and
immigration matters.
In 1986, the Legal Aid 'Efficiency Scrutiny', established by the Government,
recommended that large sections of the Green Form scheme be transfeITed to the
voluntary advice sector. Fierce debate arose and the recommendation was never
implemented, although it did set the stage for future Government intervention.
The Scrutiny made another suggestion, subsequently implemented with little
protest. In 1988, the Government passed the Legal Aid Act 1988 which transferred the administration of legal aid from the Law Society to the newly created
Legal Aid Board (LAB) (Lord Chancellor's Office, 1986). In the past, the Law
Society had wanted control over the administration of legal aid, but by 1986 it
was somewhat relieved to be absolved of responsibility, given the amount of c1iticism it had received from its members (Smith, 1997b: 154). 14 (We noted a siillilar response in 1998 by The Law Society of Upper Canada.)
Unfortunately, the transfer had no impact on law centre financing. Contrary to
the position in Australia and Ontario, funding for United Kingdom law centres has
never been part of the mainstream of publicly funded legal service. Many centres
were fonded initially from Urban Aid, a partnership between central and local
government concentrating on inner-city rejuvenation, or by charitable foundations.
14

Jn one experiment involving microfiche, a legal aid office was paralysed and unable to administer itself. After the Legal Aid Board took control, the Law Society would not have to won-y about
such embarrassments.
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These grants were time-limited, so every centre sooner or later faced major financjng problems. Jn 1975 the Labour Lord Chancellor extended central government
funding to seven law centres with financial problems but this con.cession was never
expanded. Surprisingly, the concession was continued under Conservative governments but only for those seven centres. From 1982 onwards governments took the
view that law centres were for local authorities to support. The result was an
unequa] fundin g base for law centres across England and Wales: law centres
located within the jurisdiction of Labour councils generally received better funding than those in Conservative jurisdictions. Such fundi ng inequities were exacerbated by the allegedly 'political' activities of some law centres (e.g. community
organisation or challenging the policies of the local authorities) which tended to
upset Conservative councils more than Labour ones. Nor was it just the local
authorities. As early as 1973, the Law Society had begun to criticise law centres
for 'stirring up political and quasi-political controversy far removed from their
principal mandate of ensuring equal access to the protection of the law' (Smith,
1997a:90.5). By 1979, the Labour Government's Royal Commission on Legal
Services .iwas adding to that c1iticism (Royal Commission on Legal Services,
1979). The 'Commission appeared hostile to any role for the centres beyond
increasing provision for casework in social welfare Jaw'. Particularly averse to the
activist role asserted by the law centre movement, it recommended a new era of
non-political citizens' law centres (Smith, 1997a:907). The Commission also
advised that law centre funding should be provided entirely by central government,
rather than from a variety of funders which included local governments. This
advice was never heeded since the Conservatives took office shortly after the
publication of the repo1t.
The Law Society's opposition to political activities by law centres was symptomatic of their understandable suspicion of the early law centres. The centres
espoused progressive fo1ms of lawyering which were unsettling to traditionalists,
and the fact that they offered their services free of charge was perceived as unfair
competition. Operating a law centre required a waiver from the Law Society of
the professional rules against advertising and sha1ing fees. This gave the Society
the ability to control where and when a new centre could be established. Jn 1975
a group of local practitioners in Hillingdon, outraged by the imminent funding of
a local law centre, pressed the Law Society into refusing to grant waivers to
lawyers working in the centre. The Government intervened on the side of the law
centres, threatening legislation. Eventually an accommodation was reached under
pressure from the Labour Lord Chancellor. In future, provided centres agreed not
to compete with private practitioners in such areas as adult crime, matrimonial
and personal injury litigation, probate and conveyancing, 15 the Law Society
would no longer use its powers to grant waivers as a means of controlling the
setting up of law centres (Smith, 1997b:152). In truth this compromise suited
IS

This division of labour parallels that in Ontario between clinics and the certificate scheme.
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both sides since few centres saw their mission as requiring them to invade the
traditional ru:eas of private practice. Moreover it soon became accepted that UK
law centres, by referring such work to the private profession, generated income
for the private profession rather than taking it from them.
However, the division of labour did not solve the long-term funding crisis
facing the law centre movement. Gradually they were forced to turn more and
more to individual casework funded by legal aid rather than the more innovative
forms of poverty lawyering which they had espoused in the early years. Indeed,
the amount of casework a law centre pursues is largely determined by the existence of other sources of legal aid. Following the deregulation of the profession
in the 1980s the Law Society lost its ability to curtail the work of law centres
through waivers. This has created the intriguing scenario of law centres moving
into the areas of work previously colonised by the p1ivate profession. It remains
to be seen to what extent the dependence on casework encourages moves in that
direction. To date, most centres have tried to maintain a broader concept of
'access to justice': 'Use of the [Green Form] scheme by Law Centres is indeed
regarded with a certain ambivalence by the people who work in them ... [W]hile
'Green Form' work (and other legally aided work) provided a useful source of
revenue, it was not regarded as a mainstream activity of Law Centres. It was even
in some respects viewed as representing something of a diversion from the main
work that staff wished to undertake [sic]' (Ba1dwin and Hill, 1988: 102).
The Law Centres Federation, the voice of the law centre movement, views
casework as merely one aspect of the function of a law centre. Indeed, as reflected
in the Federation's definition of a law centre, casework is often considered only
a minor aspect in the provision of services by law centres: 'Law Centres aim to
make the most efficient use of their resources and so have developed several
methods of work to achieve the best results. These include case work, participating in the process of legal reform, campaigning, education work, development
work and resourcing (providing a valuable source of inf01mation and support for
all sorts of agencies and groups)' (Law Centres Federation, 1991).
Law centres have structured themselves to deal with the need for flexibility, by
generally encouraging horizontal power structures, self-servicing, skill-shaiing
and community control. Nonetheless, these values are not all manifested in every
centre. As in Australia, community control has proved elusive in the UK, either
because the salaried staff take de facto charge of policy or because some local
autho1ities insist on a hierarchical management structure as a requirement for
funding.
Despite financial difiiculties, the number of law centres grew from 28 in 1979
to 56 in 1986. The number of citizens' advice bureaux (CABx), lay advice centres
grew from 473 in 1966 to 869 in 1986. In the same time period the volume of
enquiries at CABx had grown from 1.3 million to 6.8 million. In the 1970's, CABx
had also experimented, on a pilot basis, with the employment of solicitors; in some
cases they also combined efforts with law centres. Between 1990/1and1995/6. the
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amount of money received by law centres for 'Green Forms' increased from £1
million to £1.9 million. However, 'Green Form' payments to the private profession
in social welfare areas increased by a greater margin in the 6ame period. Similarly,
funding to advice agencies that employed lawyers increased fro'm £202,000 to
£1.2 million (Smith, 1997a:912). Moreover, in 1996, as part of a pilot project, the
LAB dispersed another £2.6 million to advice agencies that did not employ
lawyers. Since 1986, CABx and the private profession have come to attract an ever
greater percentage of legal aid funds flowing towards social welfare law. Three
principal reasons account for the shift in the delivery capacity of CABx and private
practitioners. First, private practitioners-particularly those in niche social welfare
firms (often near law centres and staffed by ex-law centre workers) began to use
the 'Green Form' scheme extensively for social welfare work (Gorie1y, 1994).
They also colonised special interest groups influential within the field. 16 Secondly,
advice centres have overtaken law centres in terms of volume of casework. Finally,
high-level test cases have become much more a specialty of national not-for-profit
pressure groups such as the Child Poverty Action Group, Shelter (a housing
campaigning organisation), and Liberty (formerly the National Council for Civil
Liberties) (Smith, 1997a:897,913). 17 It must be remembered, however, that the law
centre movement does not generally measure its success by its volume of casework
or by the number of individuals served.
In recent years, Jegal aid policies have begun to change. The advent of franchising (see Paterson and Sherr, Chapter 10, below) offered new opportunities for
funding for law centres. Franchising is a system that rewards provjders who can
satisfy criteria of competence in their work as well as adhering to key practice
management standards (Legal Aid Board, 1989:6).
A number of law centres became franchised. However, in a White Paper (UK,
1996) published by the Conservative Government, franchising evolved into the
concept of conlracti ng. In future, only providers with quality assured contracts
with the Legal Aid Board will be able to provide 'Green Form' work. The allocation of the contracts would be based on geographic assessments of need and
competition between service providers. While franchises were not intended to be
exclusive (i.e. any number of service providers could qualify to be franchised)
contracting is effectively exclusive insofar as there are a fini te number of
contracts available.
Sho1tly after the publication of the Conservative White Paper, the Labour Party
was voted into government. While the new Government adopted the Conservative
plans for contracting, Labour has also made a commitment to a community legal
aid service (Lord Chancellor's Department, 1998).
16 Organisations such as the Housing Law Practitioners Group or the lrrunigration Law
Practitioners Association, largely dominated by private practitioners, arc very influential.
17 In other jurisdictions, the function of these groups may be handled by specialty legal aid clinics. However, in England and Wales there exist both specialty clinics and lawyer-employing pressure
groups.
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While the proposals have not been passed into law at the ti me of writing, the
Government seems committed to transfenfog 'Green Form' resources towards
advice for social welfare law. This will result in opportunities for law centres and
advice agencies to obtain exclusive contracts to provide advice on aspects of
social welfare law (ibid.). While this wi11 place them in competition with the
private sector, it will only be with private firms specialising in social welfare Jaw,
of which there are relatively few.

Overview and conclusion

We return now to the questions that began this Chapter: can independent community clinics survive in a world in which governments increasingly emphasise
centralised decision-making and determination of service priorities, cost-effectiveness, financial and operational accountability, quality assurance and co-ordi·nation of service providers? Can clinic supporters adopt strategies to ensure that
they are able to retain their independence and uniqueness in the face of countervailing pressures to 'bureaucratise' or centrally manage their operations? Our
review of the clinic systems in Australia, England and Wales, and the Ontario case
study demonstrate that there are no simple answers to these questions.
Law Centres in England and Wales have never been as significant an element
in the legal aid system as the legal clinic in Australia or Ontario. The historic lack
of substantial funding for Law Centres has considerably limited their development and effectiveness. Moreover, Law Centres are now being tempted to
compete with the private bar and the advice sector for limited funds. Australian
Community Legal Centres have not suffered the same lack of funding and central
suppo1t as England's law centres. There arc, however, major cha11enges which
threaten to alter fundamentally the nature of Community Legal Centres, including the focus on centralised planning and the concurrent lack of consumer or
Legal Centre representation on the bodies governing legal aid. Of the three j urisdictions, the Ontario community clinic system appears at present best placed to
meet the current challenges effectively. Indeed, the reforms which have been
suggested by the Ontario Government do not fundamentally change the governance or operations of the community clinic system. In fact, they may strengthen
it.
To what can we attribute the comparative success of Ontario's community
clinic system? Several factors can be identified. These include the Province's
long, successful experience with community clinics; the size and the sophistication of the system; the protection afforded clinics by the Grange governance and
funding structure; the fact that political attention in recent years has been focused
on the 'crisis' in OLAP's certificate programme; the clinics' success at building
community networks; continued support for clinics among legal and bureaucratic
elites (many of whom worked in clinics as students); and the strong endorsement
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of Ontario's clinic system by domestic and internationa] observers.
Ontario's experience offers valuable insights as to the conditions required for
the continuance and future success of the cornmunity~based legal clinics. It
suggests that community legal clinics can survive, and perhaps thrive, in the face
of contemporary challenges, but that their chances of survival can be enhanced if
certain prerequisites are present:
a. clinics should have networks of supporters within their communities, the legal
profession, government bureaucracies and the governing bodies of legal aid
programmes;
b. legal aid systems should maintain a clear division of labour between the
private profession and the clinics;
c. funding sources should be stable and secure;
d. independent community clinic boards should be preserved;
e. legal aid plans should have specific administrative structures dedicated to
clinic issues; and
community
clinics should adopt new management techniques, including qualf.
ity assurance programmes, performance measures, and strategic planning,
despite expressed concerns about their relevancy to the clinic model.

In many respects, the issues defined above, though specific to the Ontario case,
identify critical aspects of a continuing clinic movement whatever the jurisdiction. For this reason, it is interesting to examine the issues in more depth and to
extrapolate as to the general applicability of the issues and concerns. Each of
these issues is discussed briefly below.
Clinics should have netvvorks of supporters within their communities, the legal
profession, government bureaucracies and the governing bodies of legal aid
programmes
The community clinic model has developed a wide range of supporters in each
clinic's respective community, in the Province's legal profession, and in the
justice system's bureaucracy. This network has been vital to preserving clinic
funding throughout changes in governments and political philosophies.
Community clinics, in both Australia and Ontario, have been effective in mobilising support at key moments to lobby in support of maintaining clinic funding.
(By contrast, since 1995 Ontario's funding for most community service providers
has been cut dramaticaJly and welfare rates have been reduced by over 20 per
cent.) Representation of clinics on state or national governing bodies drawn from
local clinic boards ensures that clinic issues and perspectives will be heard by the
legal aid authority's highest levels. Moreover, it ensures that the perspective of a
person with experience in community-based service delivery will be integral to
poJi.cy discussions.
From a clinic perspective, the appointment of a member (or members) either
representative of, or associated with community clinics would obviously be the
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best governance model. As discussed earlier, the recent changes in Austral ia seem
to be moving away from clinic or conununity leadership in legal aid adminjstration. Unlike the previous state legal aid commission, the board of directors of
Vict01ia Legal Aid does not include any nominee from community legal centres
or the community.

Legal aid systems should maintain a clear division of labour between the private
profession and the clinics
There are two straightforward reasons for ensuring a.clear division between clinic
services andjudicare services: fear of being 'overwhelmed' by criminal and family
cases, and fear of competition from the private bar. In Ontario, clinic supporters
argue in favour of a clear division between clinic services and judicare services
because of a fear that clinics could be overwhelmed by either criminal or family
cases, effectively eliminating their poverty law focus. Hence, clinic supporters in
Ontario have always argued for a 'bright line' dividing clinic and judicare practice.
In Australia, England and Wales, and Quebec the situation is reversed. The governments of these jurisdictions have intentionally promoted competition between
alternative services providers as a means to lower costs. Rather than being overrun
by crimi nal and family cases, Community Legal Centres and Law Centres are
facing competition from the private bar on their own te1ms. Increasing munbers of
private lawyers and other service providers now provide poverty law services. 18
One way to overcome the threat that this poses is to espouse a flexible, statutory definition of 'Poverty Law'. L9 Definitions which arc overly specific run the
risk that the board will refuse to authorise services being provided in areas not
mentioned in the legislative definition. Just as importantly, a specific definition
can be written and interpreted to preclude law reform activities. General definitions, on the other hand, give community boards the flexibility to respond to such
local needs as they deem appropriate.
Funding sources should be stable and secure
Clearly the Australian and Ontario clinics started with the major advantage of
central funding which has always been denied their English counterparts.
However, as US legal services (see Chapters l and 2) have found, central funding
can be lost where government and community support falter. Equally, hostility
from the local legal profession or local government can jeopardise local funding,
as several English law centres have discovered.
18

As discussed above, the Commonwealth Government in Auslralia is increasingly shifting
responsibility for social programmes such as legal aid to community legal centres and other social
organisations. This has resulted in a greater demand on both the fi nancial and personnel resources of
community legal centres. It is anticipated that case-loads in community legal centres will increase.
19 For example, the Association of Community Legal Clinics of Ontario proposed the following
definition to the Ontario Government during the Government's legal aid consultation: 'legal :issues
which particularly impact on low-income communities, and which are identified by those communities as being of critical importance to them ' (Ontario Legal Aid Review, 1997).
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Independent community boards should be preserved
It is, or should be, axiomatic that the character of corhinun.ity .clinics cannot
survive without independent community boards. The' recent Ontario Legal Aid
Review in Ontario, like others that have examined community clinics, stated that
'community governance is of fundamental importance to the mandate and operations of the com munity clinic system and the delivery of "poverty law" services'
(McCamus Report, 1997: 193). The Report described the advantages of community governance succinctly: 'Community boards have historically been important
in ensuring independence from both the [Ontario Legal Aid Plan) and the provincial government; in assisting the clinic in identifying and prioritizing community
needs; in ensuting accountability to their communities for the nature and quality
of services provided; and, through their board members, in providing vital linkages to other community services' (ibid. 193-4).
Moreover, independent boards offer several advantages to governments interested in saving legal aid costs: independent clinics hire their own staff, reducing
government payrolls and operations; the government is not legally liable for
lawsuits against the clinics; and community boards donate considerable time and
skills which might otherwise have to be paid for.
Legal aid plans should have specific administrative structures dedicated to clinic
issues
The experience in Ontai.io and Australia over the last 20 years has proven the
immeasurable value of having an administrntive structure within the lai.·ger legal
aid system specifically dedicated to clinic issues and programmes. Clinic admi nistration is fundamentally different to the administration of other pa1ts of a legal
aid programme, especially judicare. In the absence of a dedicated administrative
structure, there is a real chance that clinic issues will be lost within the larger legal
aid debate. A dedicated administrative bureaucracy can provide sophisticated
policy analysis appropri ate to, and reflective of, the community clinic system.

Adoption of modern management techniques
At this point, we must stress the distinction between adopting modern management techniques (such as quality assurance programmes, performance measures
and business planning) and centralised, hierarchical control of service p1io1ities
and delivery mechanisms. In an era in which government and legal aid administrators emphasise the need for cost-effectiveness and financial accountability,
clinic resistance to the adoption of modern management techniques is self-defeating. Future funding for clinics is clearly dependent upon clinics both being able to
deliver their services cost-effectively and their ability to prove that they can do so.
Our consideration of the history and current developments in Australia,
Canada (Ontai.fo) and the United Kingdom have Jed to certain predictions
concerning the future of the clinic movement. Despite current problems, we
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conclude on an optimistic note. Though judicare represents the predonrinant
model of service delivery in the United Kingdom and Ontario, and despite the
movement away from communily-based social programmes, community legal
clinics have generally developed slrong roots and distinctive structures that have
a unique capacity to respond to the needs and agendas of the three jurisdictions
studied. We anticipate that these strengths will allow them to continue to develop
and to respond to the expectations and needs of low-income citizens in each of
the three countries.

